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Climate change “may be a ‘crisis,’ even ‘the most pressing 
environmental problem of our time,’” which “may ultimately affect 
nearly everyone on the planet in some potentially adverse way.”1 So 
wrote Chief Justice John Roberts in his dissenting opinion, in which he 
stated that the judiciary had no role to play in addressing climate change 
when the issue first reached the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA in 
2007.2 By a 5-4 vote, the Court held in that case that greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) are “air pollutants” subject to regulation under the Clean Air 
Act.3 This established the legal foundation for current efforts by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions, a process set in motion by the Court’s additional holding that 
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the excuses for inaction offered by the Bush Administration’s 
Environmental Protection Agency were “arbitrary, capricious,” and 
contrary to law.4 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court returned to its historic 
role of intervening when the political branches of government fail to 
address critical environmental problems.5 By enabling EPA to use its 
existing regulatory authority to address climate change, the Court 
confirmed the ability of the American legal system to respond to new 
challenges. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution remains the oldest written 
constitution in the world due largely to its ability to adapt to profound 
economic and social changes that its framers could not possibility have 
foreseen.6 Even though the word “environment” is not mentioned in the 
U.S. Constitution, the judiciary has interpreted it to authorize Congress 
to enact comprehensive regulatory statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, 
to protect against environmental harm.7 The vigor with which these 
statutes are implemented and enforced has varied from one presidential 
administration to another, a fact that is well illustrated by the history of 
executive efforts to respond to climate change. 
Since taking office in January 2009, President Obama has taken a 
variety of executive actions to address the climate change problem. 
Although he was unable to persuade Congress to adopt comprehensive 
legislation to control emissions of greenhouse gases, he has prodded 
EPA to regulate GHG emissions, and he has directed federal agencies to 
promote renewable sources of energy while improving their own energy 
efficiency. These measures are described in the president’s Climate 
Action Plan, which was released on June 25, 2013.8 
This article analyzes claims that the president has overstepped his 
constitutional authority by acting in the absence of new legislation to 
address climate change. It begins with a brief historical review of the 
use of presidential power to protect the environment. It then evaluates 
the various powers the Constitution gives to the president and the 
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constitutional issues at the heart of the persistent “tug of war between 
the president and the Congress.”9 
In my previous work on presidential powers, I have argued that even 
though the president has unsurpassed ability to persuade agency heads 
to adopt policies he favors, he does not have legal authority to dictate 
the content of decisions entrusted by statute to agency heads.10  But 
presidents have historically been able to exercise powerful influence 
over environmental policy by persuading their appointed heads of 
executive agencies to act. While President Obama has purported at 
times to assert directive authority, the willingness of his appointees to 
execute his Climate Action Plan lends his authority firmer constitutional 
footing. 11  This article argues that President Obama has properly 
exercised his executive powers, particularly in light of Congress’s 
failure to enact legislation to control GHG emissions and the Supreme 
Court’s displacement of federal nuisance law in favor of executive 
action. 12  It concludes that the blurred constitutional demarcation 
between executive and legislative power, reflected in the late Justice 
Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. 
Sawyer,13 enables our system of government to work effectively when 
Congress stalls and the judiciary intervenes to spur the executive branch 
to act. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. The Early History of Presidential Actions to Protect the Environment 
In the early days of the republic, the perception that the United States 
possessed nearly limitless and untapped resources spawned federal 
policies facilitating the settlement of public lands and the promotion of 
natural resource development.14 In 1849, the Department of Interior was 
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established with a primary mission to manage public lands. 15  Land 
grants were made from the federal government’s vast inventory of 
public lands to encourage railroad construction and to promote 
settlement pursuant to the Homestead Act.16 It was not until 1872 that 
the creation of Yellowstone National Park marked the beginning of 
efforts to set aside portions of public lands as protected areas. 
In 1891 Congress authorized the president to protect forestlands 
owned by the federal government from certain kinds of development 
when it established the national forest system. 17  President William 
Henry Harrison used this authority to create thirteen million acres of 
national forests.18 President Grover Cleveland doubled the size of this 
area in his final days in office.19 
President Theodore Roosevelt undertook some of the most significant 
presidential initiatives to protect the environment when he assumed 
office after President William McKinley was assassinated in September 
of 1901. Roosevelt aggressively promoted environmental interests by 
use of his executive power. He created the first National Wildlife 
Refuge by executive order in 1903, which marked the first use of 
presidential power to protect public lands without specific approval 
from Congress.20 Roosevelt created a national conservation commission, 
as well as commissions on the management of public lands and inland 
waterways.21 Roosevelt used his Annual Message to Congress in 1905 
to decry the failure of municipal governments to control smoke 
pollution,22 and he convened the first National Governor’s Conference 
on Conservation in 1908. 
Congress expanded presidential power to set aside public lands when 
it enacted the Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizing the president to create 
protected areas designated as national monuments.23 Roosevelt used this 
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legislation to create national monuments at Devils Tower and the Grand 
Canyon. Subsequent presidents have used it to set aside additional 
federal lands, creating more than 100 new national monuments. Only 
three presidents—Reagan, Nixon, and George H.W. Bush—have failed 
to use the Antiquities Act.24 Two weeks before leaving office, President 
George W. Bush created three vast, new marine national monuments 
covering more than 195,000 square miles in the Pacific Ocean.25 
Pollution problems became more visible as industrial activity 
expanded after World War II. Congress responded to these problems by 
expanding federal assistance to states in an effort to spur them to take 
action to combat pollution. An important milestone occurred in 1956 
when Congress launched a construction grants program to fund the 
building of municipal sewage treatment plants. 26  This program was 
enacted over the opposition of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who 
was philosophically opposed to expanding the size of federal grant 
programs.27 
B. The President and the Environment After the Rise of the 
Contemporary Regulatory State 
It was not until the 1970s that Congress created comprehensive 
national regulatory programs to protect the environment, such as the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. Responding to fears from 
businesses that the new laws would lead to regulatory overreach, 
President Nixon created the first program for White House review of the 
regulatory actions by executive agencies.28 Every subsequent president 
has continued some form of White House review of agency regulatory 
actions.29 
                                                                                                                                
24 Supreme Court Upholds Clinton’s National Monuments, ENVT. NEWS SERV. (Oct. 6, 2003), 
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Eisenhower, Veto of Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Feb. 22, 1960), 
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28 President Nixon created the “Quality of Life” regulatory review program in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). 
29 President Ford continued the Quality of Life review program. President Carter replaced it 
with the Regulatory Analysis Review Group. 
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Faced with a Congress unwilling to roll back federal environmental 
regulation, President Reagan gave the Office of Management and 
Budget (“OMB”) unprecedented authority to review every proposed and 
final regulatory action by executive agencies. 30  Perhaps the most 
significant action protecting the environment taken by President Reagan 
was the negotiation of global agreements to phase out ozone-depleting 
substances. The United States played a leading role in negotiating the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Under 
Reagan’s leadership, the U.S. signed and promptly ratified both 
conventions, 31  which have become the most successful multilateral 
environmental agreements in history. 
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. Early Presidential Action 
Climate change has long been on the radar screen of federal 
environmental policy officials. The first report of the Council on 
Environmental Quality in 1970 devoted a full chapter to global warming 
and climate change.32 But it was not until two decades later that global 
negotiations focused on this issue. In 1992, President George H.W. 
Bush traveled to the Rio Earth Summit where he joined the leaders of 
153 other nations in signing the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“FCCC”) on June 12, 1992. Although the FCCC did not 
include specific targets for reducing GHG emissions, it established a 
comprehensive negotiating process for developing such controls, and it 
required developed countries to announce their own plans for emissions 
limits.33 The U.S. Senate swiftly and unanimously ratified the FCCC on 
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102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at 
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October 7, 1992,34 making the U.S. the first developed country to do so. 
When he signed the U.S. instrument of ratification, President George 
H.W. Bush pledged that the U.S. “will reduce projected levels of net 
greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2000 by as much as eleven 
percent.”35 
In December 1997 at the Third Conference of the Parties to the 
FCCC, agreement was reached on the Kyoto Protocol, which required 
the United States to reduce its GHG emissions by seven percent from 
1990 levels during the period 2008-2012. Vice President Gore played a 
major role in the Kyoto negotiations, but even so the negotiations failed 
to produce a commitment by developing nations for future controls on 
their GHG emissions. As a result, there was no chance of ratification by 
the U.S. Senate, which on July 25, 1997 had adopted the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution by a vote of 95-0. This resolution expressed the view that the 
U.S. should not sign any agreement at Kyoto that would commit 
developed nations to limit their GHG emissions unless it also required 
developing countries to limit their emissions.36 President Clinton never 
submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. 
Many believed that climate change would be a significant issue 
during the 2000 presidential campaign because the Democratic 
candidate, Vice President Al Gore, previously declared climate change 
so daunting a problem that environmental protection should become 
“the central organizing principle for civilization.” 37  Although he 
opposed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, Republican candidate 
George W. Bush also believed that climate change was a serious 
problem. In a major policy speech on September 29, 2000, Bush 
declared that if elected president he would “require all power plants” to 
control emissions of carbon dioxide (“CO2”).38 His position paper made 
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it clear that “mandatory reduction targets” would apply to major sources 
of CO2 old and new.39 This campaign promise was incorporated into the 
briefing books prepared by Bush’s transition team when he took office 
following the contested 2000 presidential election.40 
However, on March 13, 2001, just 52 days after taking office, Bush 
repudiated this campaign pledge under pressure from conservative 
senators in his own party. This greatly embarrassed EPA Administrator 
Christine Todd Whitman, who had just returned from an international 
conference where she had assured environmental officials from other 
countries of the new president’s commitment to controlling U.S. GHG 
emissions.41 Whitman writes that “[t]he president’s decision was meant 
to mollify the anti-regulation element of the far-right base, and it was 
made with too little regard for what is in fact a serious problem, or for 
how it would be received by both moderates in the United States and 
our allies abroad.” 42  Bush’s stunning policy reversal was reportedly 
engineered by Vice President Richard Cheney, who went to great 
lengths to exclude EPA and the State Department from any input in the 
decision.43 
Two years later, the Bush administration’s refusal to control GHG 
emissions resulted in a significant strategic blunder that ultimately 
produced a Supreme Court decision confirming EPA’s authority to 
regulate GHGs. In September 2003, Bush’s EPA denied a petition 
asking the agency to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles.44 By 
officially denying the petition, the EPA opened the courthouse doors to 
judicial review of whether the CAA gave the agency authority to act. By 
a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA 
ultimately held that greenhouse gases were “air pollutants” covered by 
the CAA.45 As noted above, Chief Justice Roberts, joined in dissent by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, stated that even if climate change is 
the most pressing environmental problem of our time, the harm it may 
cause is too diffuse and speculative to give anyone standing to seek 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.c-span.org/video/?159527-1/energy-issues. 
39 BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 82–83 (2008). 
40 CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF THE 
GOP AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 170 (2005) (former Bush EPA Administrator reports that “a 
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41 Id. at 171–179. 
42 Id. at 178. 
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44 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
45 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007). 
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judicial redress.46 Justice Kennedy, however, sided with the other four 
Justices in rejecting this view. This five-justice majority held that EPA 
has the authority to control greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA, 
and it rejected EPA’s excuses for failing to regulate them.47 
EPA Administrator Steven Johnson sought to respond to the Supreme 
Court’s decision by proposing to make a finding that GHG emissions 
endanger public health and welfare. However, he was blocked by the 
Office of Management and Budget, which refused even to open his 
email submitting the proposal for review. 48  On January 31, 2008, 
Johnson wrote directly to President Bush proposing that EPA make an 
endangerment finding by the end of 2008 because “[t]he state of the 
latest climate change science does not permit a negative finding, nor 
does it permit a credible finding that we need to wait for more 
research.”49 His proposal was rejected. On July 30, 2008, EPA issued an 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking that simply asked the public to 
comment generally on what EPA should do.50 
On December 19, 2007, Johnson unexpectedly denied the state of 
California a waiver allowing the state to issue controls on motor vehicle 
GHG emissions. A subsequent investigation by the House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform found substantial evidence that 
Johnson had supported the waiver, but changed his mind after 
communicating with White House staff, despite the unanimous 
conclusion of EPA staff that a denial of the waiver would likely be 
overturned in court. Johnson refused to reveal his discussions with the 
White House, but he insisted that denial of the waiver was his own 
decision.51 
B. President Obama’s Response to Climate Change 
After taking office in January 2009, President Obama moved quickly 
to take action to reverse Bush administration policies that had blocked 
                                                                                                                                
46 Id. at 542–46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
47 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
48 Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/25epa.html?_r=0. 
49 Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to President George W. Bush 
(January 31, 2008) (available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Bush-EPA-Carbon-
Reduction-Actions-2008-1-31.pdf). 
50 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 
30, 2008). 
51 EPA’s New Ozone Standards, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 
110th Cong. 137 (2008) (testimony of EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson). 
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action to reduce GHG emissions. On January 26, 2009, six days after 
taking office, the new president issued a memorandum directing the 
EPA Administrator to reconsider its denial of the California waiver in 
order to enable the state to set GHG emissions standards for motor 
vehicles.52 Obama also issued a separate memorandum to the Secretary 
of Transportation and the Administrator of the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration directing them to promulgate stronger 
fuel efficiency standards under the 2007 Energy Independence and 
Security Act (“EISA”).53 
In his first address to a joint session of Congress, which then had a 
Democratic majority in each House, the president called for enactment 
of legislation creating a comprehensive national program to control 
emissions of GHGs.54 The president’s first budget endorsed a national 
cap-and-trade system designed to reduce GHG emissions by fourteen 
percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and eighty-three percent below 2005 
levels by 2050,55 measures that ultimately were incorporated into the 
Waxman-Markey bill that passed the U.S. House by a vote of 219-212 
on June 26, 2009.56 But he also warned that if Congress failed to act, 
EPA would use its existing regulatory authority in the CAA to control 
these emissions. 
During the 2008 presidential campaign, President Obama supported a 
cap-and-trade program that would auction off all emissions allowances. 
The president’s first proposed budget stated that the auctioning of 
allowances was necessary “to ensure that the biggest polluters do not 
enjoy windfall profits.”57 The budget estimated that the auction would 
raise $150 billion over ten years that “will fund vital investments in a 
clean energy future” with the balance of the revenues “returned to the 
                                                                                                                                
52 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 26, 2009) 
(available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/california-request-waiver-under-clean-
air-act). 
53 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec’y of Transp. & the Adm’r of the 
Nat’l Highway Transp. Safety Admin. (Jan. 26, 2009) (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/energy-independence-and-security-act-2007). 
54 Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery, Address to Joint Session 
of Congress, Feb. 24, 2009, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-
Joint-Session-of-Congress/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
55 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 100 (2009) [hereinafter A NEW ERA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY], available at  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2010-BUD-22.pdf. 
56 H.R. 2454 (111th): American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, 
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454 (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
57 A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 55, at 100. 
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people, especially vulnerable families, communities, and businesses to 
help the transition to a clean energy economy.” 58  However, the 
Waxman-Markey bill approved by the House largely abandoned the 
auction approach in an effort to gain the support of electric utilities and 
other industry sectors that would have received the bulk of allowances 
for free.59 This substantially diminished enthusiasm for the legislation 
among the environmental community. 
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved its 
own cap-and-trade legislation in November 2009. The Clean Energy 
Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, S. 1733, was approved by a vote 
of 11-1 with all seven Republican members of the committee boycotting 
the vote in protest. However, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
announced in July 2010 that the absence of bipartisan support in the 
Senate had persuaded him not to seek a floor vote on cap-and-trade 
legislation.60 After the 2010 midterm elections gave Republicans control 
of the House, it became clear that it would be impossible to pass 
national climate legislation, and while the enactment of environmental 
legislation often has required some “trigger event”—usually a highly 
publicized incident of visible environmental harm that generates 
immediate public concern61—even Hurricane Sandy in 2012 was not 
enough to shake opposition to climate legislation in the 113th Congress 
from the estimated 160 Representatives, a majority of the Republicans 
in the House, who are on record as denying that climate change is real.62 
Thus, as Obama had promised, EPA acted to regulate emissions of 
GHGs. On April 17, 2009, EPA proposed to find that emissions of 
GHGs endanger public health or welfare, which would trigger their 
                                                                                                                                
58 Id. 
59 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWANCES UNDER THE 
AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (WAXMAN-MARKEY) (2009), available at 
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/policy-memo-allowance-distribution-under-waxman-
markey.pdf. 
60 Carl Hulse & David Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y. TIMES (July 
22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23cong.html?_r=1&. 
61 Examples include the “Superfund” legislation adopted in 1980 after highly publicized 
contamination of homes in Love Canal by previously buried hazardous wastes, the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act adopted in 1986 in response to the Bhopal tragedy, 
and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 adopted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See Robert 
V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective Action, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 20–21 (1998). 
62 Jeff Spross, The Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus, THINK PROGRESS (June 26, 2013), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate-denier-caucus/ (noting that these 160 representatives have 
received more than $55.5 million in campaign contribution from fossil fuel industries that are the 
leading contributors to GHG emissions). 
2014] Presidential Power to Address Climate Change 145 
regulation under the CAA.63 On December 7, 2009, EPA made a formal 
“endangerment finding” for GHGs.64 
President Obama also took executive action to reduce GHG 
emissions by federal entities. In October 2009, he issued Executive 
Order 13514, which requires federal agencies to establish targets to 
control their GHG emissions. 65  The order also directs agencies to 
increase energy efficiency, reduce waste, conserve water, reduce fleet 
petroleum consumption, and utilize government purchasing power to 
support environmentally friendly products. 66  On May 21, 2010, 
President Obama issued a memorandum directing federal agencies to 
develop the first fuel economy standards for medium and heavy-duty 
trucks for model years 2014-18 and to tighten another fuel efficiency 
and emissions standard for passenger cars and light-duty trucks starting 
in 2017.67 
After making its finding that emissions of greenhouse gases 
“endanger public health and or welfare,” EPA issued a “Tailpipe Rule” 
setting standards for GHG emissions from motor vehicles.68 Following 
its longstanding interpretation of the CAA, EPA concluded that the 
Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered regulation of stationary sources of 
GHG emissions under two programs (Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration, “PSD,” and “Title V”) that require permits for sources of 
“any air pollutant.”69 EPA determined that major stationary sources of 
GHGs would be subject to PSD and Title V permitting on January 2, 
2011, the date the Tailpipe Rule became effective.70 This became known 
as the “Timing Rule.” 
The most controversial aspect of the EPA’s action was its effort to 
tailor the permitting regulations to initially apply to only the very largest 
sources of GHG emissions in what it called the “Tailoring Rule.” The 
                                                                                                                                
63 Jonathan Wiesman & Siobhan Hughes, U.S. in Historic Shift on CO2, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 
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and Environmental Protection Through a Transformation of Our Nation’s Fleet of Cars and 
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531, 533, 536–38). 
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CAA sets statutory thresholds of 100 and 250 tons of emissions per year 
for various sources to be covered by the PSD and Title V permit 
programs.71 Because so many sources emit GHGs, the EPA estimated 
that 81,000 PSD permits and 6.1 million Title V permits would fall 
within the statutory thresholds. Because this would overwhelm the 
permit programs, EPA issued the Tailoring Rule to apply the permit 
requirements only to sources whose GHG emissions exceed 75,000 or 
100,000 tons per year.72 This includes sources responsible for 86 percent 
of GHG emissions from stationary sources.73 
Various industry groups and states challenged the EPA’s action by 
filing scores of petitions for review in the D.C. Circuit. The court 
consolidated the cases into a single proceeding reviewing the EPA’s 
Endangerment Finding, its Tailpipe Rule, and its Timing and Tailoring 
Rules. Oral argument consumed two full days. So many hundreds of 
lawyers were involved in the cases that the listing of their names 
occupies six full pages of the Federal Reporter. 
On June 26, 2012, the D.C. Circuit unanimously dispatched all of the 
challenges in a per curiam opinion by Chief Judge Sentelle and Judges 
Rogers and Tatel.74 The panel upheld the Endangerment Finding and 
Tailpipe Rules, and it determined that EPA’s conclusion that the 
Tailpipe Rule triggered the PSD and Title V permit requirements was 
“unambiguously correct.” 75  The court dismissed challenges to the 
Timing and Tailoring Rules by finding that no party had standing to 
challenge EPA’s failure to regulate smaller sources, a rare example of 
standing doctrine being used to benefit environmental interests.76 
Climate change was never mentioned during the 2012 presidential 
debates, but in his acceptance speech Republican nominee Mitt Romney 
mocked President Obama for his pledge “to begin to slow the rise of the 
oceans and heal the planet.”77 This came back to haunt him less than 
two months later when Hurricane Sandy devastated the east coast of the 
U.S., destroying much of the Jersey shore and flooding lower 
Manhattan. In his second inaugural address, President Obama pledged, 
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“[w]e will respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that the 
failure to do so would betray our children and future generations. Some 
may still deny the overwhelming judgment of science, but none can 
avoid the devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and 
more powerful storms.”78 
In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama issued one 
of his strongest calls for congressional action on climate change. He 
stated, “for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to 
combat climate change.” 79  While recognizing “that no single event 
makes a trend,” he noted that “the twelve hottest years on record have 
all come in the last fifteen” and that “[h]eat waves, droughts, wildfires, 
floods—all are now more frequent and more intense.” 80  Citing 
“Superstorm Sandy,” he stated that we could choose to believe that it 
was “just a freak coincidence” or instead to “believe in the 
overwhelming judgment of science—and act before it’s too late.” 81 
Obama urged “Congress to get together to pursue a bipartisan, market-
based solution to climate change.”82 But he warned that “if Congress 
won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my 
Cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take, now and in the 
future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities for the 
consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more 
sustainable sources of energy.”83 
Despite Democratic gains in the 2012 elections, Congress remains 
wary of enacting climate legislation. During the 112th session of 
Congress, the Republican-controlled U.S. House of Representatives was 
the most anti-environmental house of Congress in U.S. history. In the 
twenty months that it was in session before adjourning on September 
21, 2012, the House passed 317 anti-environmental measures.84 Nearly 
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all of these measures died in the Democratic-controlled U.S. Senate, 
which is more sympathetic to environmental regulation.85 
In June 2013, President Obama announced a comprehensive 
approach to slow the effects of climate change in his Climate Action 
Plan. 86  The plan outlines strategies for cutting carbon pollution, 
preparing the U.S. for the impacts of climate change, and leading 
international efforts to mitigate global climate change. The plan pledges 
regulations of GHG emissions from stationary sources such as power 
plants, tightened fuel economy standards, and improved efficiency in 
energy use in U.S. homes and businesses. It sets a goal to double 
electricity generation from renewable sources by 2020. 87  The plan 
specifies that the Department of Interior will issue permits for an 
additional ten gigawatts of renewable energy projects on public lands by 
2020.88 
Under the plan, federal officials will work with states, cities, and 
local communities to support climate-resilient investment and to remove 
policies that increase vulnerabilities. 89  EPA is incorporating climate 
change impacts and adaptive measures into programs, such as the Clean 
Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds.90 Additionally, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development is requiring grant 
recipients in the Hurricane Sandy-affected regions to consider sea-level 
rise in future development projects.91 
To protect the U.S. economy and natural resources from the negative 
effects of climate change, the plan seeks to improve the resiliency of 
energy infrastructure, to encourage leadership by insurance companies 
and to help with efforts to manage drought, to reduce wildfires, and to 
prepare for floods.92 The plan emphasizes that these efforts should be 
undertaken through increased interagency cooperation and 
collaboration. The plan also encourages the development of climate data 
to assist government officials, communities, and businesses in 
understanding and addressing the risks associated with climate change.93 
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The president’s plan also pledges that the U.S. will lead international 
efforts to address global climate change. It seeks to couple national 
efforts to combat climate change with international action to reduce 
emissions, prepare for climate impacts, and spark progress through 
international negotiations. Two promising components of the plan 
include termination of support for public financing of new coal plants 
overseas and elimination of U.S. fossil fuels tax subsidies in the fiscal 
year 2014 budget.94 To promote the transition to renewable electricity 
generation at an international level, the U.S. plans to work with trading 
partners to encourage global free trade in clean energy technologies, 
such as solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal. 95  The Obama 
Administration already has mobilized billions of dollars for investments 
in clean energy projects in developing countries. A major focus of U.S. 
efforts in the international arena is to encourage a global transition away 
from coal and towards natural gas as a “bridge fuel” to help countries 
make the transition to cleaner sources of energy.96 The Climate Action 
Plan claims to be a “blueprint for steady, responsible national and 
international action to slow the effects of climate change.”97 
Environmentalists generally have praised the President’s Climate 
Action Plan as a step in the right direction,98 while also noting that “it 
will require continued presidential leadership to translate the plan’s 
good intentions into concrete policy.” 99  The president’s political 
opponents argue that it will “increase the cost of energy and kill more 
American jobs at a time when the American people are still asking 
‘where are the jobs?’”100 They also argue that in light of Congress’s 
failure to enact new legislation addressing climate change, the president 
has overstepped the bounds of his constitutional authority. Senator 
Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said on the Senate floor that “[t]he president 
looks more and more like a king that the Constitution was designed to 
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replace.” 101  Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer accused 
President Obama of “gross executive usurpation” that “disdains the 
Constitution,” and undermines “the very creation of new law.”102 
III. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Analysis of claims that the president has exceeded his constitutional 
authority should begin by recognizing the murky state of law in this 
area, particularly given the judiciary’s historic reluctance to umpire 
disputes between Congress and the president. The Steel Seizure Case103 
remains one of the few precedents on the limits of executive power. 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in this case argues that the scope 
of permissible executive power varies depending upon how aggressively 
Congress has asserted itself in the particular policy area that is the focus 
of executive action.104 
A. Criticisms of President Obama’s Use of Executive Power 
It seems inevitable that views concerning the proper scope of, and 
limits on, executive power depend in large part on which political party 
controls which branch of government. While in the Senate, President 
Obama was a prominent critic of the exercise of executive power by his 
predecessor, President George W. Bush, particularly with respect to the 
conduct of the “War on Terror.”105 Now that Obama is president, his 
critics argue that he has embraced some of the expansive theories of 
executive power he previously criticized.106 Conversely, some of those 
who benefited from President Bush’s expansive assertions of executive 
power now argue that the same policies employed by President Obama 
have crossed constitutional bounds.107 
Even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, expanded 
executive power had become a prominent feature of the modern 
                                                                                                                                




103 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
104 Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court). 
105 Baker, supra note 101. 
106 Anita Kumar, Obama Turning to Executive Power to Get What He Wants, MCCLATCHY 
DC (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-
executive-power.html; see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE 
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 5 (2012). 
107 Carl Hulse, Role Reversals Emerge in Dispute Over Obama’s Recess Appointments, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at A11. 
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presidency. Presidents Reagan and Bush increased their control over 
executive agencies to advance their conservative agendas.108 President 
Clinton responded to opposition from a Republican Congress by 
increasing White House involvement in agency rulemaking and using 
executive orders to achieve domestic policy goals. 109  This spawned 
considerable criticism of Clinton for executive overreach.110 After the 
Bush Administration launched the “War on Terror,” 111  “increased 
executive power” officially became “one of the key elements of the 
emerging constitutional revolution.”112 
When compared to the actions of his predecessors, President 
Obama’s assertions of executive power do not appear exceptional. 
President Obama has issued executive orders at the lowest rate of any 
president since President William McKinley in the nineteenth century 
(see Figure I below). 113  What appears to be of greater concern to 
Obama’s critics is his perceived change of position on the scope of 
executive powers since his time in the U.S. Senate. 
 
FIGURE I. EXECUTIVE ORDERS BY PRESIDENT114 
President and Term of Office  Number  Per Year in Office 
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)  381   47.6/year   
George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)  166   41.5/year   
William J. Clinton (1993-2001)  364   45.5/year   
George W. Bush (2001-2009)  291   36.4/year 
Barack Obama (2009-2013)  167   33.4/year 
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During his initial presidential campaign, Obama was a critic of the 
use by previous presidents of “signing statements” that questioned the 
constitutionality of provisions in bills the presidents signed into law. 
The practice, which involves the president issuing a written statement of 
constitutional objections, originated in the Reagan administration and 
became more prevalent during the administrations of President George 
H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. As illustrated by Figure II, President 
Obama has issued signing statements far less frequently than the two 
Bushes, but he has not completely eliminated their use. 
 
FIGURE II. SIGNING STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT 
President  No. of Signing Statements                  No. of Challenges 
Ronald Reagan  16 (2/year)    22 (2.8/year) 
George H.W. Bush 71 (17.8/year)   150 (37.5/year) 
William J. Clinton 16 (2.0/year)    39 (4.9/year) 
George W. Bush 63 (7.9/year)   386 (48.3/year) 
Barack Obama  10 (2.3/year)    78 (9.8/year) 
 
Obama also appointed an estimated thirty-eight “czars,” executive 
branch employees responsible for making the federal bureaucracy work 
with respect to specified issues.115 These appointments, not subject to 
Senate confirmation, were criticized as “a series of constitutional end-
runs and a power grab by a frustrated and legacy-driven president.”116 
White House counsel Gregory Craig defended these appointments by 
arguing that they were not designed “to supplant or replace existing 
federal agencies or departments, but rather to help coordinate their 
efforts and help devise comprehensive solutions to complex problems,” 
which “is, and always has been, the traditional role of White House 
staff.”117 
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President Obama has argued that he is justified in using executive 
power expansively because of congressional gridlock.118 During the first 
two years of the Obama Administration, the Democrats controlled both 
Houses of Congress, but after Republicans regained control of the 
House in 2010 Obama increasingly relied on executive powers.119 As 
Professors Jody Freeman and David Spence have documented, 
Congress has failed to update major regulatory statutes for decades 
because of legislative gridlock produced by ideological polarization of 
its members.120 They argue that in the absence of clear direction from 
Congress, the president and executive agencies are in the best position 
to adapt old statutes to new problems and that the judiciary generally 
should defer to such efforts. 
As this article goes to press, the Supreme Court, in a decision 
upholding EPA’s regulations governing interstate air pollution, again 
has indicated its willingness to give EPA leeway to adopt reasonable 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language in the CAA. The Chief 
Justice and five other Justices concluded that EPA had acted properly in 
interpreting the CAA to give the agency flexibility to base the degree of 
emission reduction required by upwind states on their ability to reduce 
emissions cost-effectively.121 
B. Executive Power to Address Climate Change 
When he represents the interests of the United States in conducting 
foreign policy, President Obama’s powers are extremely broad.122  A 
clear example of this is Obama’s agreement with Chinese President Xi 
Jinping to support a global phase-out under the Montreal Protocol of 
hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), ozone-depleting substances that also are 
potent greenhouse gases.123 Obama also used his foreign policy powers 
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to bypass Congress on a critical global environmental issue when he 
determined that the U.S. could deposit its instrument of acceptance for 
the Minimata Convention on Mercury without seeking Senate 
ratification.124 On November 6, 2013, the U.S. became the first country 
formally to accept the convention after the Obama Administration 
determined that existing U.S. law already provided sufficient authority 
for the U.S. to implement it.125 
The president’s Climate Action Plan specifies an ambitious timetable 
for EPA to regulate GHG emissions. EPA has a solid legal foundation 
for action in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Massachusetts v. 
EPA and American Electric Power v. Connecticut. As noted above, 
Massachusetts v. EPA126 held that GHG emissions were air pollutants 
subject to regulation under the CAA. In American Electric Power, the 
Court unanimously held that because the CAA delegated authority to 
EPA to regulate GHG emissions, it displaced the federal common law 
of nuisance in an action brought by eight states and the City of New 
York against six of the largest electric utilities operating coal-fired 
power plants in the United States.127 
These decisions make it clear that EPA has broad authority under the 
existing Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions. Although industry 
groups asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review virtually every aspect of 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding EPA’s GHG regulations, the 
Supreme Court granted review solely to the question whether the 
Tailpipe Rule “triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air 
Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” 128  At oral 
argument on February 24, 2014, the Justices made it clear that they were 
not entertaining any thoughts of overruling Massachusetts v. EPA129 or 
reversing EPA’s endangerment finding. Thus, it is clear that EPA has 
the authority to regulate GHG emissions. The only question under 
consideration by the Court is which parts of the CAA can be used for 
that regulation. 
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Given the Court’s confirmation of EPA’s authority to regulate GHG 
emissions under the CAA, the only viable question concerning 
executive overreach is whether EPA overstepped its bounds when it 
decided not to regulate all sources that the Act normally subjects to 
regulation under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) 
program. In essence, the industry challengers are claiming that EPA has 
been too reasonable in focusing its regulatory attention only on the 
largest sources that generate eighty-six percent of GHG emissions. 
Aside from this issue, which may produce a 5-4 split when the Court 
decides the case by June 2014, there is little question that the bulk of 
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan can be carried out by executive 
action alone. Arguments that regulation of GHGs under the CAA 
represent a power grab by the Obama Administration ignore the fact 
that the Supreme Court has twice confirmed EPA’s authority to regulate 
GHGs under the CAA.130 As the Court opined in American Electric 
Power, regulation by an expert administrative agency is preferable to 
regulation “by judicial decree under federal tort law.”131 EPA “is surely 
better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad 
hoc, case-by-case injunctions” because 
[f]ederal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological 
resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order. 
Judges may not commission scientific studies or convene groups of 
experts for advice, or issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures 
inviting input by any interested person, or seek the counsel of regulators 
in the States where the defendants are located.”132 
Thus, EPA is “better suited to serve as primary regulator of 
greenhouse gas emissions.”133 
IV. CONCLUSION 
During the 1970s, Congress’s adoption of landmark environmental 
laws promised the public comprehensive protection against threats to 
public health and the environment. These laws were updated and refined 
by Congress during the decade of the 1980s. However, since the 
adoption of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, legislative gridlock 
has largely removed Congress from shaping environmental policy by 
legislative action. After an effort to win adoption of a new climate 
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change law failed, the Obama administration has been using executive 
action to address this important problem through the issuance of 
regulations and other executive actions. This article analyzes claims that 
the president has overstepped his constitutional authority by acting in 
the absence of new legislation to address climate change. Reviewing the 
history of the use of presidential power to protect the environment, this 
article concludes that the president is simply performing his historic role 
of acting to address important problems by using his existing authority 
when Congress fails to act. 
